

Ідеологічна складова діяльності урядових кабінетів у Країнах Східної Європи (1991–2014)

У статті запропоновано теоретико-методологічний і емпіричний аналіз ідеологічної складової діяльності урядових кабінетів у країнах Східної Європи впродовж 1991–2014 рр. Проаналізовано суть феномену політичної ідеології та партійної поляризації, виокремлено та верифіковано сім'ї ідеологічних партій як складову діяльності урядів у різних країнах Східної Європи. Визначено, як партійні і непартійні уряди кореспондують з ідеологічними детермінантами парламентських партій, які їх підтримують.

Ключові слова: політична ідеологія, партійна поляризація, урядовий кабінет, Східна Європа.

The ideological component of government cabinets in Eastern European Countries (1991–2014)

The article is dedicated to theoretical, methodological and empirical analysis of the ideological component of government cabinets in Eastern European countries (in 1991–2014). The author analyzed the essence of the phenomenon of political ideology and party polarization, singled out and verified the families of ideological parties as a component of cabinet activity across Eastern European countries, determined how party and non-party governments correspond with ideological determinants of parliamentary parties that support them.

Keywords: political ideology, party polarization, government cabinet, Eastern Europe.

The regularity of political development of the most countries of the world (including post-Soviet ones in Eastern Europe, namely Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) is concentration of main authority in line with the institutions of executive power. Scientists interpret this phenomenon as an objective result of contemporary statehood evolution. It is logically to remark, that executive power is a totality of state administrations and institutions, which carries out authoritative-political, and authoritative-administrative functions. The apex of the executive power system, depending on the constitutional systems of government, can be president alone (which is not distinctive of Eastern European countries, as nowadays there are no classical presidential

republics in the region), unilaterally government, represented by the prime-minister (what is natural for Moldova, which is a classical parliamentary republic) or the president and government simultaneously (what is distinctive of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, which formally are half-presidential republics, that is in dependence of the presidential and prime-minister's formal and factual power and authority, realize constructions of dual executive power, where the institutional roles both of the president and government can be observed). In this context, evaluation of governments, in *particular ideological components and determinants of governments activity*, is of great importance within the frames of Eastern European countries selection. The main point is, that nowadays in the region, the practice of party governments formation, which operate with political party ideologies as one of the main factors of institutionalization of governments, has not been institutionalized yet. However, very often one can encounter non-party governments, where the place of political party ideologies has a secondary meaning. Most governments in Eastern European countries, first of all, are formed in the light of fulfillment of the constitutional requirements as to getting the support of parliamentary majority. But, as today non-democratic (authoritarian) political regimes can be found in the region, where the specificity of government formation is based on the support of the predominant or hegemonial presidential party, which usually has its own parliamentary majority, ideological questions as the components of governments activity pale into insignificance. And the simple rule of quantitative/dimensional overrepresentation of the party or parties, which form the governments, comes to the foreground. But even in this case ideological parameters of governmental activity should be taken into consideration, as the formal and factual government cabinets in the context of their formation, functioning and responsibility are not isolated from the parliaments, which consist of political parties. The latter are the political organizations, which a priori are characterized by political ideology. That is why, depending on the type of the constitutional system of the government and government cabinets, peculiarities of political party structuring of the parliaments, especially, peculiarities of party and non-party political forces in the parliaments etc., the ideological constituent of governmental activities in Eastern European countries, in particular in the period of 1991-2014, i.e. since the moment of declaration of independence, proclaimed by the countries of the region, and till nowadays, becomes more or less remarkable in the political context and significant in the context of political analysis.

Problematics of analysis of the ideological component of the governmental activities in Eastern European countries in contemporary political science is little-investigated. Even despite the fact that many researchers have handled the investigations in Eastern Europe, they usually had nothing to do with the government cabinets activities. Among such investigations

it is necessary to distinguish such personalities as: R. Fawn¹, H. Giliomee and C. Simkins², A. Arian and S. Barnes³, S. Cornell⁴, U. Backes and P. Moreau⁵, K. Dawisha and B. Parrott⁶, A. Kulik and S. Pshizova⁷, G. Nodia and A. P. Scholtbach⁸, P. Lewis⁹, P. Culeac¹⁰, J. Bugajski¹¹, S. Ramet¹², J. Hahn¹³, J. Löwenhardt¹⁴, J. K. White¹⁵, M. Bader¹⁶, S. Birch¹⁷, P. D'Anieri¹⁸ and others. Also it is significant to take into consideration general and theoretical ideas, dedicated to the scientific analysis of party ideological influence on the government cabinets activities (in particular beyond the borders of Eastern European countries). Among the most actual and cited researchers one should mention: J. Lane, D. McKay and K. Newton¹⁹, B. Powell²⁰, Z. Maoz and Z. Somer-Topcu²¹, P. Warwick²², B. Nyblade²³, A. Blais, E. Gidengil, R. Nadeau and N. Nevitte²⁴, P. Converse and R. Pierce²⁵, I. McAllister and M. Wattenberg²⁶, E. Browne,

¹ R. Fawn, *Ideology and National Identity in Post-communist Foreign Policies*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.

² H. Giliomee, C. Simkins, *The Awkward Embrace. One-Party Domination and Democracy*, Wyd. Harwood Academic Publishers 1999.

³ A. Arian, S. Barnes, *The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability*, „The Journal of Politics” 1974, vol 36, s. 592–614.

⁴ S. Cornell, *Democratization Falters in Azerbaijan*, „Journal of Democracy” 2001, vol 12, nr 2, s. 118–131.

⁵ U. Backes, P. Moreau, *Communist and post-communist parties in Europe*, Wyd. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2008.

⁶ K. Dawisha, P. Parrott, *Conflict, cleavage, and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.; K. Dawisha, P. Parrott, *Russia and the new states of Eurasia: the politics of upheaval*, Wyd. University of Cambridge 1994.

⁷ A. Kulik, S. Pshizova, *Political Parties in Post-Soviet Space: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltics*, Wyd. Praeger Publishers 2005.

⁸ G. Nodia, A. P. Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects*, Wyd. Eburon Delft 2006.

⁹ P. Lewis, *Party development and democratic change in post-Communist Europe: the first decade*, Wyd. Routledge 2001.

¹⁰ P. Culeac, *Contradictory electoral behavior and the post-Soviet party-system in Republic of Moldova*, Wyd. ProQuest 2007.

¹¹ J. Bugajski, *Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the post-Communist era*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 2002.

¹² S. Ramet, *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.

¹³ J. Hahn, *Democratization in Russia: the development of legislative institutions*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 1996.

¹⁴ J. Löwenhardt, *Party politics in post-communist Russia*, Wyd. F. Cass 1998.

¹⁵ J. K. White, *Political parties and the collapse of the old orders*, Wyd. SUNY Press 1998.

¹⁶ M. Bader, *Against All Odds: Aiding Political Parties in Georgia and Ukraine*, Wyd. Vossiuspers UvA 2010.

¹⁷ S. Birch, *The social determinants of electoral behaviour in Ukraine, 1989–1994*, Wyd. University of Essex 1998.

¹⁸ P. D'Anieri, R. Kravchuk, T. Kuzio, *Politics and society in Ukraine*, Wyd. Westview Press 1999.; P. D'Anieri, *Understanding Ukrainian politics: power, politics, and institutional design*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 2007.

¹⁹ J. Lane, D. McKay, K. Newton, *Political Data Handbook: OECD countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997.

²⁰ B. Powell, *Extremist Parties and Political Turmoil: Two Puzzles*, „American Journal of Political Science” 1986, vol 30, nr 2, s. 357–378.

²¹ Z. Maoz, Z. Somer-Topcu, *Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems: A Social Networks Analysis of European Parliaments 1945–98*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 2009.

²² P. Warwick, *Ideological Diversity and Government Survival in Western Democracies*, „Comparative Political Studies” 1992, vol 25, s. 332–361.; P. Warwick, *Policy Horizons and Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2006.

²³ B. Nyblade, *Reconsidering Ideological Diversity and Government Survival*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association 2004.

²⁴ A. Blais, E. Gidengil, R. Nadeau, N. Nevitte, *Measuring party identification: Britain, Canada and The United States*, „Political Behavior” 2001, vol 23, nr 1, s. 5–22.

²⁵ P. Converse, R. Pierce, *Measuring Partisanship*, „Political Methodology” 1985, vol 11, s. 143–166.

²⁶ I. McAllister, M. Wattenberg, *Measuring Levels Of Party Identification – Does Question Order Matter?*, „Public Opinion Quarterly” 1995, vol 59, nr 2, s. 259–268.

D. Gleiber, C. Mashoba and J. Frendreis²⁷, A. Heath and R. Pierce²⁸ and others. But the above-mentioned researchers have not paid much attention to the ideological component of governmental activity in Eastern European countries, and in particular to the problematics of evaluation of government cabinets in the light of such correlation as “ideological positioning of the government – parliamentary support of the government – party rivalry in the context of the government formation and responsibility – composition of the government». The solution of this problem, which belongs to the scope of contemporary academic literature, is in the focus of our research.

Proceeding with the analysis of the governmental component in governmental activity in Eastern European countries, it is necessary to refer to the general and theoretical peculiarities of political ideology and party polarization influence on government cabinets activity. It should be mentioned that *political ideology* is usually interpreted as the system of conceptually formalized notions, ideas and views on political life, which reflects people’s, classes’ nations’, societies’, parties’ interests, world-views, ideals, dispositions, and consequently can be considered to be a form of social consciousness and cultural phenomenon. Political ideology includes knowledge about political life and evaluation of political processes from a bearer’s of ideology point of view, i.e. contains various preconceptions. In any case, ideology is a variety of corporate consciousness, which reflects merely group’s point of view towards the course of political and social development. From the standpoint of political functions, ideology is aimed at uniting, integrating of the society on the basis of certain social group’s interests or goals, which are not grounded on any specific layers of the society. Thus, in accordance with various types of ideological grounds for politics, place and role of the state in the society, interrelation between a person, society and state, ways and means of public changes, there are good reasons to single out several crucial *types of political ideology* (they are mainly distinguished in accordance with the “from left to right” principle in the ideological spectrum): anarchism, national-bolshevism, communism, socialism, ecologism/environmentalism, social-democracy, liberalism, centrism, agrarianism, Christian democracy, conservatism, nationalism, fascism, national socialism (Nazism). It is notable, that various types of political ideologies are often mutually exclusive. It means that in the context of cross-party rivalry, which is mostly distinctive of democratic political regimes and shrinks in various types of autocracy, one can often observe active confrontation between parties of different ideological orientation or generally prevailing political ideologies. It is especially described in the light of party polarization, i.e. support, expressed by voters to “extremist” parties, whose ideological orientation greatly

²⁷ E. Browne, D. Gleiber, C. Mashoba, *Evaluating Conflict of Interest Theory: Western European Cabinet Coalitions 1945–80*, „British Journal of Political Science” 1984, vol 14, s. 1–32.; E. Browne, J. Frendreis, D. Gleiber, *The Process of Cabinet Disolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies*, „American Journal of Political Science” 1986, vol 30, s. 628–650.

²⁸ A. Heath, R. Pierce, *It Was Party Identification All along – Question Order Effects on Reports of Party Identification in Britain*, „Electoral Studies” 1992, vol 11, nr 2, s. 93–105.

differs from the orientation, which is traditional for the system²⁹. Z. Maoz explains polarization as the existence of ideologically bounded and distinct parties (blocs/coalitions), which possess practically equal shares of parliamentary mandates³⁰. This is especially actual for the countries, where the process of government formation requires support of parliamentary majority, that under ordinary conditions is native to all Eastern European countries. Taking into consideration this fact, it is theoretically obvious that the governments, which are less ideologically diversified/differentiated and party polarized, must be more effective and stable in their activity. But party and ideological polarization is a relative distance, and is not an absolute value of ideological difference between parties, which form or support government cabinets, i.e. it is defined as a “party horizon” or the degree of political compromise in the context of government cabinets formation and responsibility, as well as evaluation of their stability and effectiveness³¹.

Relativity of “party polarization” category, especially in the context of analysis of ideological constituent of the governments activity, is proved by the fact, that the degree of polarization can be evaluated in different ways: by means of calculation of party lists, percentage of electoral places in the parliament; by means of calculation of proportion of places, represented by parties, which are “extremist” towards each other; on the basis of “preconceived party identification”, where the role of the party is considered to be rivalry in the left-right spectrum; by means of measuring the “divergence” from the ideological centre within the frames of party systems; by means of ideological comparison of the biggest political parties in the system; by taking into consideration standardized left-right differences of all parties in the system. In this context P. Warwick offered to consider party polarization on the basis of party ideology, which is implemented through such dimensions as: left-right, secular-clerical, support/absence of support for regime, and also materialists-post-materialists³².

But the abovementioned approach is not effective in the context of analysis of ideological components of governmental activities in Eastern European countries, where (in comparison with Western European countries, which were the first to use these methods) party systems are weakly institutionalized and do not always comply with all declared dimensions of party ideology. Besides, the level of party polarization in Eastern European countries is analytical-variable, as it depends on several criteria: degree of party rivalry and ideological closeness (especially in the cases of “situational” coalition formation in the countries, which are not

²⁹ M. Mareš, *Extremist Parties in East Central Europe during post-communist transformation process*, Paper has been written as part of the Research Plan „Political Parties and Representation of Interests in Contemporary European Democracies”, Atlanta, June 11-13 2008.; B. Powell, *Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.; B. Powell, *Extremist Parties and Political Turmoil: Two Puzzles*, „American Journal of Political Science” 1986, vol 30, nr 2, s. 357–378.

³⁰ Z. Maoz, Z. Somer-Topcu, *Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems: A Social Networks Analysis of European Parliaments 1945–98*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 2009.

³¹ P. Warwick, *Policy Horizons and Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2006.

³² P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

characteristic of party government cabinets); historical heritage of party systems, which includes continuity of traditional parties and mobilization of new ones; different institutional roles of parties in the process of government formation; specificity of structures of party organizations, which in Eastern Europe hugely require self-development of parties and political systems; sufficient number of specific channels of cross-party communication, where the customer-based relations are of great importance; influence of special types of electoral systems etc. on ideological differentiation of political parties/party systems. The situation is complicated by the fact, that in case of Eastern European countries, transit societies are in the focus, and none of them as of 2014 could not be classified as a fully democratic one (authoritarian and hybrid political regimes are represented in the region). That is why, the experience of parliamentary democracy in Eastern Europe is insignificant or absent at all. Besides, non-party government cabinets are very often formed in the region, and because of this, politicians often have their own interest concerning the essence of governmental policy and try to bring it nearer to their own benefits and interpretation, and this lowers the role of political party ideologies. It means, that ideological difference between partners in the parliamentary and governmental coalitions in case of formation of party governments or parliamentary majority constructions in the course of non-party formation appeared to be extremely vague.

That is why, party and ideological polarization in the context of Eastern European countries does not always effectively affirm the existence of the ideological constituent in governmental activity. Sometimes, the ideological constituent in governmental activity can be efficiently evaluated on the grounds of simple consideration of various ideological peculiarities of different political parties, which form or support government cabinet. It is especially urgent in the light of the fact, that in the region the process of party government formation is not a norm of a political process, and on the contrary, in most cases in 1991-2014 non-party government cabinets prevailed (for detailed information see Table 1). But even despite this, it is quite obvious, that the more ideological distance between government/pro-government parties is, the more possible are the conflicts within the system of executive power and the more complicated is activity of government cabinets. To determine, the extent to which government or pro-government (which just provide support for the government cabinet) parties are ideologically remote, the category of “the level of parties ideological diversity” is applied, i.e. the search for and acquisition of empirical information are carried out, and on the basis of which the “ideological disposition” (from left to right) of all parties is determined. In case of one-party or nonparty governments, which possess support of one parliamentary party (what is rather peculiar of Eastern European countries), determination of ideological vector in government cabinets activity is rather simple, on the grounds of one-line determination. For the party governmental coalition or coalition as a means of ensuring parliamentary majority for

nonparty government, the situation is proportionally complicated, depending on the number of participants in such a coalition³³.

Consequently, concerning Eastern European countries, in particular in the context of parties and government cabinets, it has been decided to apply adjusted methodology of political ideology evaluation, proposed by J. Lane, D. McKay and K. Newton³⁴. The researchers have classified parties and government cabinets (which are usually backed up by these political parties) as to their ideological orientation into several "families." Among them are communist, social-democratic or socialist, ecological, agrarian, liberal, conservative, nationalistic, religious, personalistic, and regional³⁵. Besides, the scientists have singled out several additional categories of ideological/non-ideological positioning of political parties and electoral blocs. These are alliances or electoral coalitions of different ideological character and parties without strict ideological affiliation. Thus, the comparative analysis of governments and parliamentary parties, which provide support for governments, is significantly different. In this context, Eastern European countries are not the exception (for detailed information see Table 1).

³³ Methodologically it is described in the following studies: R. Axelrod, *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics*, Wyd. Markham Pub. Co. 1970.; M. Taylor, M. Laver, *Government Coalitions in Western Europe*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1973, vol 1, s. 205–248.

³⁴ J. Lane, D. McKay, K. Newton, *Political Data Handbook: OECD countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997.

³⁵ Regionalism is interpreted as a political ideology, which is focused on the interests of any particular region or a group of regions, distinguished traditionally or on the basis of formal data (on the grounds of political or administrative division, positioning of subnational units). Regionalism becomes apparent during the activity, concerning the growth of influence and political significance of a certain region or a group of regions, and on the basis of ideas implementation, concerning limited (regions' rights, decentralization etc.) or broadened forms of autonomy (separatism, independence etc.). Regionalists often prefer loose federation or confederation, but not a unitary state with strong centralized power (depending the fact whether the parties of this ideological spectrum are in power).

Table 1. The Ideological Component of the Governments Activity or Parameters of the Governments Ideological Support by the Parliamentary Parties in Eastern European Countries (1991–2014)³⁶

1	2	3	4	5	6
Prime-Minister	Terms of government cabinet staying in power	Prime-minister's party	Type of government	Type of government specification	Leading ideological component of governments activity or parameters of leading ideological support of governments by parliamentary parties
AZERBAIJAN					
H. Hasanov	18.10.1991 – 04.04.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
R. Huseynov	16.06.1992 – 30.01.1993	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
P. Huseynov	28.04.1993 – 30.06.1993	AXC	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
S. Huseynov	30.06.1993 – 07.10.1994	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
F. Gullyev	07.10.1994 – 20.07.1996	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
A. Rasizade 1	26.11.1996 – 11.10.1998	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
A. Rasizade 2	11.10.1998 – 04.08.2003	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
I. Aliyev	04.08.2003 – 04.11.2003	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
A. Rasizade 3	04.11.2003 – 29.10.2008	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
A. Rasizade 4	29.10.2008 – 22.10.2013	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
A. Rasizade 5	22.10.2013 – current	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
BELARUS					
V. Lebech	19.09.1991 – 21.07.1994	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation
M. Chigir	21.07.1994 – 18.11.1996	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation
S. Ling	19.02.1997 – 18.02.2000	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian
V. Vermoshin	14.03.2000 – 01.10.2001	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian and nationalistic

³⁶ Legend: n/p – non-membership of the prime-minister in any party (non-party); AXC – Azerbaijan National Front; YAP – Party „New Azerbaijan“; AzHM – National Democratic Union; PANM – Pan-Armenian National Movement; H – Republican Bloc; M – Bloc „Unity“; HHK – Republican Party of Armenia; RT-FG – „Round table – Free Georgia“; UCG – Civil Unity of Georgia; Union of Citizens of Georgia; NMD – National Movement – Democrats; ENM – United National Movement „For Prosperous Georgia“; KO – „Georgian Dream“; FPM – Popular Front of Moldova; PDAM – Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova; CDM – Electoral Bloc „Democratic Convention of Moldova“; PCRM – Communist Party of the Moldova Republic; PLDM – Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova; NDR – Party „Our Home – Russia“; ER – Party „United Russia“; VOH – All-Ukrainian Association „Community“ (Hromada); NDPU – National Democratic Party of Ukraine; PPPU – Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine; PR – Party of Regions; B – All-Ukrainian Union „Fatherland (Batkivshchyna)“; NU – Bloc „Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraina)“; NF – „People's Front (Narodnyi Front)“.

1	2	3	4	5	6
G. Novitsky	10.10.2001 – 10.07.2003	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian and nationalistic
S. Sidorsky 1	19.12.2003 – 08.04.2006	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian and nationalistic
S. Sidorsky 2	10.04.2006 – 27.12.2010	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian and nationalistic
M. Myasnikovich	28.12.2010 – 27.12.2014	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian
A. Kobiakov	27.12.2014 – current	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian
ARMENIA					
V. Manukyan	13.08.1990 – 22.11.1991	AZHM	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	liberal
G. Harutyunyan	22.11.1991 – 30.07.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	liberal
K. Harutyunyan	30.07.1992 – 02.02.1993	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	liberal
H. Bagratyan 1	03.02.1993 – 29.07.1995	PANM	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	liberal
H. Bagratyan 2	29.07.1995 – 04.11.1996	H	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Sargsyan	04.11.1996 – 19.03.1997	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
R. Kocharyan	20.03.1997 – 03.02.1998	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Darbinyan	10.04.1998 – 11.06.1999	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
V. Sargsyan	11.06.1999 – 27.10.1999	M	party	single party minority	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Sargsyan	03.11.1999 – 02.05.2000	M	party	single party minority	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Margaryan 1	12.05.2000 – 05.03.2003	M	party	coalitional majority	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Margaryan 2	05.03.2003 – 25.03.2007	HHK	party	coalitional minority	nationalistic
S. Sargsyan 1	25.03.2007 – 12.05.2007	HHK	party	coalitional minority	nationalistic
S. Sargsyan 2	12.05.2007 – 19.02.2008	HHK	party	coalitional majority	nationalistic
T. Sargsyan 1	09.04.2008 – 27.04.2009	HHK	party	coalitional majority	nationalistic
T. Sargsyan 2	27.04.2009 – 06.05.2012	HHK	party	coalitional majority	nationalistic
T. Sargsyan 3	06.05.2012 – 13.04.2014	HHK	party	coalitional majority	nationalistic
H. Abrahamyan	13.04.2014 – current	HHK	party	coalitional majority	nationalistic
GEORGIA					
Z. Gamsakhurdia	09.04.1991 – 26.05.1991	RT-FG	party	single party majority	nationalistic

1	2	3	4	5	6
B. Gugushvili	23.08.1991 – 06.01.1992	RT-FG	party	single party majority	nationalistic
T. Siguia 1	06.01.1992 – 11.10.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation
T. Siguia 2	11.10.1992 – 05.08.1993	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
O. Patsatsia	20.08.1993 – 05.10.1995	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
N. Lekishvili	08.12.1995 – 26.07.1998	UCG	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
V. Lortkipanidze	07.08.1998 – 11.05.2000	UCG	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
G. Arsenishvili	11.05.2000 – 21.12.2001	UCG	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Jorbenadze	21.12.2001 – 27.11.2003	UCG	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
Z. Zhvania 1	27.11.2003 – 28.03.2004	NM-D	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
Z. Zhvania 2	28.03.2004 – 03.02.2005	NM-D	party	single party majority	nationalistic
Z. Noghaideli	17.02.2005 – 16.11.2007	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
L. Gurgendze 1	22.11.2007 – 20.01.2008	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
L. Gurgendze 2	20.01.2008 – 01.11.2008	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
G. Megaloblishvili	01.11.2008 – 30.01.2009	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
N. Gilauri	06.02.2009 – 04.07.2012	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
V. Merabishvili	04.07.2012 – 25.10.2012	ENM	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
B. Ivashvili	25.10.2012 – 20.11.2013	KO	party	single party majority	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
I. Garibashvili	20.11.2013 – current	KO	party	single party majority	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
MOLDOVA					
V. Muravtschi	27.08.1991 – 01.07.1992	FPM	party	coalitional majority	religious
A. Sangheli 1	01.07.1992 – 27.02.1994	PDAM	party	single party majority	agrarian
A. Sangheli 2	27.02.1994 – 24.01.1997	PDAM	party	single party majority	agrarian
I. Ciubuc 1	24.01.1997 – 22.05.1998	PDAM	party	single party majority	agrarian
I. Ciubuc 2	22.05.1998 – 01.02.1999	CDM	party	coalitional majority	socialist/social democratic
I. Sturza	19.02.1999 – 01.12.1999	CDM	party	coalitional majority	socialist/social democratic
D. Braghij	21.12.1999 – 25.02.2001	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic
V. Tarlev 1	19.04.2001 – 06.03.2005	PCRM	party	single party majority	communist
V. Tarlev 2	19.04.2005 – 20.03.2008	PCRM	party	single party majority	communist
Z. Greceanii 1	31.03.2008 – 10.06.2009	PCRM	party	single party majority	communist

1	2	3	4	5	6
Z. Greceanii 2	10.06.2009 – 09.09.2009	PRM	party	single party majority	communist
V. Filat 1	25.09.2009 – 28.11.2010	PLDM	party	coalitional majority	liberal
V. Filat 2	14.01.2011 – 25.04.2013	PLDM	party	coalitional majority	liberal
I. Leancă	31.05.2013 – current	PLDM	party	coalitional majority	liberal
RUSSIA					
B. Yeltsin	25.12.1991 – 15.06.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
Y. Gaidar	15.06.1992 – 14.12.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
V. Chernomyrdin 1	15.12.1992 – 23.12.1993	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
V. Chernomyrdin 2	20.01.1994 – 09.08.1996	n/p	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially liberal, communist, socialist/social democratic, personalistic
V. Chernomyrdin 3	10.08.1996 – 23.03.1998	NDR	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially liberal, communist, socialist/social democratic, personalistic
S. Kiriyenko	24.04.1998 – 23.08.1998	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially liberal, communist, socialist/social democratic, personalistic
Y. Primakov	11.09.1998 – 12.05.1999	n/p	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially liberal, communist, socialist/social democratic, personalistic
S. Stepashin	19.05.1999 – 09.08.1999	n/p	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially liberal, communist, socialist/social democratic, personalistic
V. Putin 1	16.08.1999 – 26.03.2000	NDR	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic
M. Kasyanov	17.05.2000 – 24.02.2004	n/p	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic + conservative
M. Fradkov 1	05.03.2004 – 07.05.2004	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic + conservative
M. Fradkov 2	12.05.2004 – 12.09.2007	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic + conservative
V. Zubkov	14.09.2007 – 07.05.2008	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic + conservative
V. Putin 2	08.05.2008 – 07.05.2012	ER	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic + conservative
D. Medvedev	08.05.2012 – current	ER	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic + conservative
UKRAINE					
V. Fokin	24.08.1991 – 01.10.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	communist
L. Kuchma	13.10.1992 – 21.09.1993	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	communist
Y. Zvyahilsky	27.09.1993 – 16.06.1994	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	communist
V. Masol	16.06.1994 – 04.04.1995	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal

1	2	3	4	5	6
Y. Marchuk	08.06.1995 – 27.05.1996	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal
P. Lazarenko 1	28.05.1996 – 05.07.1996	VOH	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal
P. Lazarenko 2	11.07.1996 – 02.07.1997	VOH	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal
V. Pustovoitenko	16.07.1997 – 30.11.1999	NDPU	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal
V. Yushchenko	22.12.1999 – 28.04.2001	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal
A. Kinakh	29.05.2001 – 16.11.2002	PPPU	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic
V. Yanukovych 1	21.11.2002 – 05.01.2005	PR	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/ dissimilar-ideological + partially socialist/social democratic
Y. Tymoshenko 1	04.02.2005 – 08.09.2005	BYT	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
Y. Yekhanurov	22.09.2005 – 26.03.2006	NU	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
V. Yanukovych 2	04.08.2006 – 17.10.2006	PR	party	coalitional majority	socialist/social democratic
V. Yanukovych 3	17.10.2006 – 18.12.2007	PR	party	coalitional majority	socialist/social democratic
Y. Tymoshenko 2	18.12.2007 – 03.03.2010	BYT	party	coalitional majority	electoral coalition/ dissimilar-ideological
M. Azarov 1	11.03.2010 – 09.12.2010	PR	party	coalitional majority	socialist/social democratic
M. Azarov 2	09.12.2010 – 03.12.2012	PR	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic
M. Azarov 3	13.12.2012 – 28.01.2014	PR	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic
A. Yatsenyuk 1	27.02.2014 – 27.11.2014	B	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/ dissimilar-ideological (right centre)
A. Yatsenyuk 2	02.12.2014 – current	NF	party	coalitional majority	electoral coalition/ dissimilar-ideological (right centre)

Źródło: <http://zarate.eu/countries.htm> [odczyt: 01.09.2014]; <http://en.wikipedia.org> [odczyt: 01.09.2014]; <http://en.wikipedia.org> [odczyt: 01.09.2014]; Z. Bialobloski, *Stabilnist to efektywnist uradiw u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy: Monohralia*, Wyd. Wydawnictwi tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013.

Thus, in Azerbaijan during 1991–2014 one can observe the application of two ideological constructions, viz. nationalistic and personalistic. The first was peculiar of the party-governmental system in 1991–1994 and based on the influence of the Azerbaijan National Front (AXC). The second one was initiated by H. Aliyev in 1994 (and formally in 1995) and it still exists under the influence of the personalistic party “New Azerbaijan” (YAP).

In Belarus, due to the mainly non-party representation in the parliament, it is very difficult to determine ideological constructions of the government cabinets. It was especially noticeable in 1991–1996, when there was the parliament, elected as a result of the Soviet system regime in 1990. During this period the constructions of cabinets without ideological affiliation were used. In 1997–2000 agrarian parties (in particular the Agrarian union of Belarus, ASB) were prominent (as a result of a low number of mandates). Since 2000 despite non-ideological orientation of Belarus governments, the influence of communist ideas became more and more marked, especially of the Communist Party of Belarus (PKB), which used modification influence of agrarian (the Agrarian union of Belarus, ASB), and earlier (till 2010) nationalistic parties (the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus, LDPB). But in general the ideological component of governments in Belarus is characterized by the absence of strict ideological affiliation.

In Armenia during 1991–2014 several ideological constructions of governments were created: 1) 1990–1995 – with liberal parties support (the National Democratic Union, AZhM; the PanArmenian National Movement, PANM); 2) 1995–2003 – support of dissimilar-ideological electoral coalitions (the Republican Bloc, H³⁷; the “Unity”, M³⁸); 3) since 2003 – together with the leading support of nationalistic parties (the Republican Party of Armenia, HHK³⁹).

Within the context of Georgia in 1991–2014 it is necessary to single out the following types of government ideological constructions: 1) predominance of nationalistic parties’ influence (the “Round Table – Free Georgia”, RT-FG) (during 1991); 2) without ideological affiliation (1992); 3) influence of dissimilar-ideological electoral coalitions (during 1992–1995⁴⁰ and 1995–2003⁴¹); 4) influence of nationalistic parties (the National Movement – Democrats, NM-D, and the United National Movement, ENM) (in 2004–2012); 5) influence of dissimilar-ideological electoral coalition the “Georgian Dream” (KO)⁴² (since 2012).

³⁷ The union between the PanArmenian National Movement (PANM), “Intellectual Armenia”, “Republican Party” (HHK), Christian and Democratic Union, Social Democratic Party (Hu), Democratic Liberal Party (HRAK) was formed.

³⁸ Formed by the Republican Party (HHK) and the People’s Party (HZhK).

³⁹ Used modification influence of other parties: 1) liberal (the “Country of Law”, OEK); 2) socialist (the Armenian Revolution Federation, HHT); 3) personalistic (the Party of Prosperous Armenia, BHK).

⁴⁰ On the basis of political positions of such political forces: 1) electoral coalitions (the Bloc of Peace, BM; the Bloc of “October 11”, 11.10) and others; 2) ecological parties (the Party of Greens, SMP).

⁴¹ In this period the leading one was the coalition of the Civil Union of Georgia (UCG). On the other hand, this bloc positioned itself as a consultative member of the Socialist International, and this affirmed socialist orientation of the political force. The coalition in 1995–1999 used modification influence of such parties as: national-conservative (the National Democratic Party, EDA); regional (the Adzharian Union for Revival of Georgia, DAP).

⁴² Ideological orientation of electoral coalition is not unidirectional. One part positions itself as pro-market and pro-western liberal, and

In Moldova during 1991–2014 the following ideological models of government cabinets can be singled out: 1) with predominant influence of religious parties (the Popular Front of Moldova, FPM⁴³) 1991–1992; 2) with predominant influence of agrarian parties (the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova, PDAM) in 1992–1998⁴⁴; 3) with predominant influence of socialist parties (the Party of Democratic Forces, DFP; and the Democratic Party of Moldova, PDM) in 1998–2001⁴⁵; 4) as a result of influence of communist party (the Communist Party of the Moldova Republic, PCRM) in 2001–2009; 5) with influence of liberal parties (the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova, PLDM; Liberal Party, PL; the Alliance “Our Moldova”, AMN⁴⁶), since 2009.

In Russia during 1991–2014 existed the following ideological constructions of government cabinets: 1) predominance of nationalistic parties (the Democratic Party of Russia, DPR⁴⁷) – in 1991–1993; 2) without ideological affiliation and predominance of certain types of ideological parties in government cabinets, and in constructions of government support (partial influence of such families of ideological parties as liberal (the “Choice of Russia”, VR; the Party “Apple”, Yabloko; the “Democratic Choice of Russia”, DVR), socialist (the Agrarian Party of Russia, APR; the Party of Russian Unity and Consent, PRES; the party “Our Home – Russia”, NDR; the Interregional movement “Unity”, Y), communist (the Communist Party, KPRF) and personalistic (the party “Go Ahead Russia!”, V-R) was observed) – in 1994–1999; 3) predominance of socialist parties (the “Fatherland – the Whole Russia”, OVR; the Interregional movement “Unity”, Y) – in 2000–2003; 4) predominance of personalistic and conservative party (the “United Russia”, ER), since 2003⁴⁸.

another as radically nationalistic with elements of xenophobia rhetoric.

⁴³ The modification by the members of the former (abandoned in 1991) Communist Party of Moldova (PCM) took place.

⁴⁴ The governments were usually modified by the electoral coalitions (the Electoral Alliance “Bloc of Peasants and Intellectuals”, BTI) and religious parties (the Electoral Bloc “Alliance of the People’s Christian and Democratic Front”, FPCD).

⁴⁵ The cabinets during this period were modified by the influence of the conservative bloc “The Democratic Convention of Moldova” (CDM).

⁴⁶ The governments were formed under the influence of socialist parties (social-democratic parties), in particular, the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM).

⁴⁷ Due to the prohibition of the Communist Party of the USSR (KPRS), the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) was considered to be the one, which had the majority of party mandates in the parliament during 1991–1993.

⁴⁸ T. Brader, J. Tucker, *The emergence of mass partisanship in Russia, 1993–1996*, „American Journal of Political Science“ 2001, vol 45, nr 1, s. 69–83.; P. Chaisty, Party Cohesion and Policy-Making in Russia, „Party Politics“ 2005, vol 11, nr 3, s. 299–318.; S. Del, *Parties, Media Control and Power in Post-Soviet Russia and Kazakhstan*, Paper presented at the ECPR Graduate Conference, Dublin 30 August – 1 September 2010.; G. Golosov, Who survives? *Party origins, organizational development, and electoral performance in post-communist Russia*, „Political Studies“ 1998, vol 46, nr 3, s. 511–543.; H. Hale, *Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism and the State*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2006.; J. Ishiyama, „Red versus expert”: *candidate recruitment and communist party adaptation in post-Soviet politics*, „Party Politics“ 1998, vol 4, nr 3, s. 297–318.; H. Kitschele, R. Smyth, *Programmatic Party Cohesion in Emerging Postcommunist Democracies: Russia in Comparative Perspective*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 2002, vol 35, s. 1228–1256.; H. Oversloot, R. Verheul, *Managing Democracy: Political Parties and the State in Russia*, „Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics“ 2006, vol 22, nr 3, s. 383–405.; J. Pammert, J. DeBardleben, *Citizen orientations to political parties in Russia*, „Party Politics“ 2000, vol 6, nr 3, s. 373–384.; J. Riggs, J. Schraeder, *Russia’s Political Party System as a (Continued) Impediment to Democratization: The 2003 Duma and 2004 Presidential Elections in Perspective*, „Demokratizatsiya“ 2005, vol 13, nr 1, s. 141–151.; M. Urban, V. Gelman, *The development of political parties in Russia*, [w:] K. Dawisha, B. Parrott (eds.), *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 175–219.

In Ukraine during 1991–2014 were formed the following ideological constructions of governments: 1) predominance of communist ideology during 1991–1994 (on the basis of composition of the parliament, formed in 1990, and as a result of the Communist party formation, KPU); 2) without ideological affiliation and predominance of certain types of ideological parties in government cabinets, in constructions of government support (partial influence of such families of ideological parties as: agrarian (the Peasant Party of Ukraine, SelPU; the Peasant Bloc, SB), nationalistic (the National Movement of Ukraine, NRU), socialist (the Socialist Party of Ukraine, SPU; the People's Democratic Party of Ukraine, NDPU) and liberal (the All-Ukrainian Association "Community" (Hromada), VOH) was observed) in 1994–2001; 3) the period of predominance of social parties (SPU, NDPU and the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (SDPU(o)) – in 2001–2002; 4) predominance of electoral coalitions – in 2002–2005⁴⁹, 2005–2006⁵⁰ and 2007–2010⁵¹; 5) predominance of parties of socialist orientation (social democratic) in 2006–2007 (the Party of Regions, PR, and the Socialist Party of Ukraine, SPU, the influence of the left Communist Party of Ukraine, KPU, should be mentioned as well)⁵² and since 2010 (predominant influence of the Party of Regions, PR, limited influence of the Communist Party of Ukraine, KPU)⁵³; 6) predominance of electoral coalitions since 2014.

In relation to democratizatonal and authoritarian processes in Eastern European countries, one rather interesting conclusion can be observed – in the countries, which are striving

⁴⁹ In accordance with the influence of the Bloc «For United Ukraine» (ZYU), formed on the basis of such families of ideological parties: 1) agrarian – the Agrarian Party of Ukraine (APU); 2) socialist – the People's Democratic Party of Ukraine (NDPU), the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (PPPU), the "Labor Party of Ukraine" (TU), the Party of Regions (PR) (at that time was rather close to the principles of social-democracy). Also there was support on the basis of the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united). Therefore, the shift of support towards the left ideological centre took place.

⁵⁰ In accordance with the influence of the Bloc «Our Ukraine» (ZYU), formed on the basis of such families of ideological parties: 1) nationalistic – the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), the People's Movement of Ukraine (NRU), the Christian People's Union (HNS), the Ukrainian People's Movement (UNR); 2) liberal – the Liberal Party of Ukraine (LPU), the Party "Reforms and Order" (PRP), the Party "Solidarity" (Sol); 3) religious – the Republican Christian Party (RHPU), the Party "Go Ahead, Ukraine!" (VU); 4) parties without ideological affiliation. Besides, during this period the governments were formed under the influence of the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), the "Fatherland" (B) (till 2007), the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (PPPU) – mostly of socialist orientation.

⁵¹ In accordance with the influence of the electoral coalition "Yuliia Tymoshenko's Bloc" (BYT), which was formed on the basis of the following families of ideological parties: 1) nationalistic – the Ukrainian Platform "Sobor" (Sob), the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), 2) social democratic – the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP); 3) conservative – the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (UKRP); 4) religious – the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (UHDP); 5) liberal conservative – the Party "Fatherland" (B). Ideological affiliation of the party "Fatherland" is extremely interesting. Till 2007 it had been left-centrist political force, but in 2008 became the observer of the European People's Party (EPP), and then the associated member of the International Democratic Union (IDU). Consequently, this party should be determined now as liberal-conservative, pro-European or moderate-conservative, the ideological positions of which get into the boundaries of right-centrism. However, in 2007–2010 the dissimilar ideological character of the electoral coalition "Yuliia Tymoshenko's Bloc" (BYT) was generally noticed. Besides, the influence of another also dissimilar-ideological electoral coalition "Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense" was observed.

⁵² Due to the modified influence, parties of the following orientation: communist – the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU); socialist – the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU). During this period the Party of Regions is considered to be close to the socialist and democratic ideals, though it has mainly revealed since 2010.

⁵³ Due to the modified influence, parties of the following orientation: communist – the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU); electoral coalitions – Lytvyn's Bloc (the People's Party (NP) and the party "Strong Ukraine" (SU)), which were close to the centrist positions. The peculiar place was occupied by the dominating governmental force – the Party of Regions. In 2010–2013 it should have been interpreted as a left-centrist social democratic one.

for establishing and consolidation of democratic political regimes, the role of liberal, agrarian and religious parties or parties with right-centrist ideological orientation, as the constituent of government activity, grows. As opposed, in the countries, which aim at conservation of current authoritarian and hybrid regimes, grows the role of communist and personalistic political forces. The conclusion, concerning socialist/social democratic and nationalistic parties within the composition of the government or support of the government in Eastern European countries is ambiguous, as such parties interpret themselves as intermediate between two declared political regimes and governmental policy in the countries of region. It is interesting, that centrist parties, especially in the context of government activity and support, are not native to Eastern European countries (in particular, in the interpretation, which is popular in the West). It can be explained by numerous factors, for instance by transition period, instability of party systems, and young party and electoral systems. Besides, centrist parties are also personalistic. But the biggest problem is the existence of government cabinets without ideological affiliation in some Eastern European countries. Their practice should have corresponded the process of non-party governments formation (in particular of technocratic type), but in Eastern European countries this process is reduced to the problem of determination of the ideological vector of government (pro-government) parties. All these prove general weakness of party system development in the region. As opposed in Eastern European countries non-party governments are very often personalistic. Personalization of party systems is a result of the peculiar process of presidential elections⁵⁴ and leads to the weakness of party systems. The point is, that under such conditions the process of party formation occurs on the basis of rivalry during presidential elections (one can observe the dependence of parliamentary parties formation on the fact that at first these parties were created as “satellites” in the course of presidential elections⁵⁵, and the leading role belongs to the “customer-based relations”⁵⁶).

One of the problems of strict ideological positioning of governments in Eastern European countries, in particular in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia (earlier in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine), lies in the fact that among the governments, which were formed in the region during 1991-2014, non-party governments prevail. Traditionally, among them one singles out two types – governments, formed by experts (usually they are interpreted as technocratic, technical, transitional or auxiliary, as the expert constituent of such governments and appointments

⁵⁴ J. Linz, *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?*, [w:] J. Linz, A. Valenzuela (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 11.; S. Mainwaring, L. Torcal, *Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democracy*, [w:] R. Katz, W. Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*, Wyd. Sage Publications 2006, s. 204–227.; S. Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave Democracies: The Case of Brazil*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1999.; D. Samuels, *Prezidentialized Parties: The Separation of Powers and Party Organization and Behavior*, „Comparative Political Studies” 2002, vol 35, nr 4, s. 461–483.

⁵⁵ H. Kitschelt, Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markowski, G. Tóka, *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Competition*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.; E. Sulciman, *Presidentialism and political stability in France*, [w:] J. Linz, A. Valenzuela (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 137–162.

⁵⁶ S. Piattoni, *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2001, s. 205–206.

within them are primary and mostly depend on parliamentary support of several parties) and non-party governments (in which the role of expert appointments in departments is of small and secondary importance, and governments are supported by predominant or hegemonial parties, which possess absolute and independent majority in parliaments). The former (they are not peculiar of Eastern Europe, though were applied in Moldova and Georgia) are usually based on partial or full support or delegation from several parliamentary parties, which cannot create party government, i.e. depend on parliamentary and party constituents, however the crucial role in such government formation is the ability to solve efficiently all tasks, raised for the cabinet of ministers or separate ministers (especially in the context of system reforms and avoidance of political crisis). It means, that in such governments some ministers-experts, being technocrats, at the same time can represent certain party and ideological motives of those political forces, which support them. The latter (they usually represent the phenomenon of non-party governments in Eastern Europe and permanently are native to Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia, and earlier were peculiar of Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine) in the process of their initialization and formation are focused on exclusion of any or all party and ideological components, as in their presence the ability to solve effectively the tasks, imposed before the government, is usually predetermined on the basis of its non-party composition. The additional peculiarity of ideological constituent of such governments activity (being more precise its formal absence) in eastern Europe is the fact that non-party character of the government is a stabilizing factor of power systems and current political regimes. It is especially actual in the context of Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia, which apply practice of the “absence” of ideology within the frames of non-party governments formation (not as cabinets of experts) as a stabilizing factor of authoritarian/personalistic political regimes. The common conclusion, adherent to all expert governments (technocratic governments) and non-party governments in the light of attribution to ideology, is that predominant (in comparison with party governments) absence of ideological commitments and obligatory party principles of such governments activity, transform institutional loyalty of non-party and technocratic governments into one, which is especially dependent on the sanctions and rules, mentioned in the constitution.

However such reasoned “biased” aloofness of governments from ideology leads to the interdependent result of the political process, as technocratic and non-party governments are marked by the existence of party-electoral systems weakness and the absence of institutional stimuli to consolidate the latter, and vice versa – party-electoral systems stay uninstitutionalized and undeveloped as a result of permanent formation of technocratic and non-party governments. It gives an opportunity to make a conclusion, that the absence of rivalry within the environment of party ideologies (in particular in the context of government cabinets formation), especially within the systems, characterized by technocratic and non-party governmental cabinets, leads to formation of party-electoral systems, which are established not on the

basis of ideological, but of customers lines⁵⁷ (it does not refer to Moldova, where technocratic cabinets were formed extremely rarely). It is rather actual for nondemocratic, especially authoritarian, political regimes in Eastern European countries, where the “absence” of ideology (in political party interpretation), within the context of government cabinets activity, must be considered as manifestation of loyalty to the political regime, ability to participate in strategic manipulations and the idea of adherence to the specific (ruling) political rhetoric or the so called ideology of “political class”.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned, that nowadays in Eastern Europe the ideological constituent of governments activity in most cases is a secondary one (the exception is Moldova, and to some extent Ukraine and Georgia). It makes clear, that democratization of political regimes contributes to ideologization of government cabinets, however authoritarianization of political regimes leads to de-ideologization and personalization of governments. In Eastern Europe, according to the character of government cabinets support, predominate personalistic patterns (Azerbaijan, Russia), and constructions on the basis of dissimilar ideological electoral (Georgia) and parliamentary (Ukraine) coalitions. As of 2014 such classical ideological patterns as the constituents of government cabinets activity were reflected in Armenia (nationalism) and Moldova (liberalism). Belarus is predetermined by permanent non-ideology, i.e. the absence of ideological affiliation of political forces and politicians, who form and support government cabinets.

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⁵⁷ H. Kitschelt, *The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies*, „Party Politics” 1995, vol 1, nr 4, s. 447–472.; O. Prot-syk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, „Europa-Asia Studies” 2003, vol 55, nr 7, s. 1077–1095.

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